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The Grammaticalization of Evidentiality in English

ERIC MELAC

Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3

This paper argues that the data on English evidential markers indicate that evidentiality is not a grammatical category which is only applicable to some languages, but can be considered a universal semantic function that tends to trigger the grammaticization of lexical forms. This study investigates five criteria that can help us locate linguistic forms on the lexicon-grammar continuum: reduction, desemanticization, backgrounding, decategorialization, and paradigmatization. Although it has not reached the full maturity of so-called ‘evidential languages’, English provides evidence of the grammaticization of evidentiality. Evidentiality is thus a relevant notion for English which substantially impacts the organization of the lexicon of the language, and the evolution of its grammar.

Keywords: Evidentiality, Grammaticalization, Modals, Parentheticals, Perception verbs

1 INTRODUCTION

It is estimated that around one quarter of the world’s languages have a grammatical evidential system (Aikhenvald 2004: 30), but despite a recent, growing interest, evidentiality remains under-researched because it does not seem to concern Indo-European languages. Although most studies on evidentiality have focused on so-called ‘evidential languages’ (Chafe & Nichols, eds., 1986; Aikhenvald 2004; ed., 2018), evidentiality is in fact a universal semantic domain that leaves a functional gap in languages lacking a grammatical paradigm for it (Boye & Harder 2009). One might thus wonder how relevant the notion of evidentiality is for a language such as English.

The majority of studies that deal with Indo-European languages use a different definition of evidentiality than the prevailing one in linguistic typology, and many focus on pragmatics rather than on semantics (Fox 2001; Precht 2003; Alonso-Almeida & Cruz-García 2011). Other studies on Indo-European languages do use a stricter definition of evidentiality, closer to the one adopted in typological studies, and show how the notion

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can also apply to the linguistic forms of languages that are usually considered ‘non-evidential’ (Squartini 2007; Cornillie 2007; Diewald & Smirnova, eds., 2010).

Several studies refer to evidentiality in English, but scholars disagree on what an evidential is. Chafe (1986) investigates English evidentials in academic writing, and considers any linguistic form relating to knowledge to be ‘evidential’, whether it expresses ‘reliability’, such as certainly, ‘mode of knowledge’, such as in my opinion, or ‘expectation’, such as actually. Nuyts (2001: 25–28) uses the notion of evidentiality to distinguish between a subjective and an intersubjective epistemic evaluation. Gisborne & Holmes (2007) refer to what Palmer calls the two kinds of ‘evidential modality’: ‘reported’ and ‘sensory-perceptual’ (Palmer 2001: 35–52). They explore the diachronic developments of English verbs of appearance, such as seem, and Aijmer (2009) provides further details on their evidential functions. Whitt (2009; 2010; 2011) describes English perception verbs, and includes stance, (inter)subjectivity, as well as ‘generalized observation, inference, knowledge and understanding’ as part of evidentiality. Brinton (1996: 211–64) provides a diachronic and synchronic description of phrases like I guess, which she calls ‘epistemic parentheticals’, focusing on their pragmatic functions. In Brinton (2017: 132–4), she further explores the interaction and overlap between epistemic and evidential parentheticals. Finally, López-Couso & Méndez-Naya (2014) describe the evolution of epistemic/evidential parentheticals, such as seem/appear/look/sound like without distinguishing the epistemic and evidential domains explicitly. The vast majority of these studies posit that English expresses evidentiality lexically, but a few do suggest signs of early grammaticalization for some specific phrases (Aijmer 2009; Whitt 2009; López-Couso & Méndez-Naya 2014).

Adopting a definition similar to that used in typological research, I intend to examine the rendering of evidentiality in English, and investigate whether the language possesses grammatical evidentials. The article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the definitions of evidentiality and grammaticalization. Section 3 introduces the methodology I used to collect a corpus and determine what can be counted as an evidential. Section 4 presents the data that lead me to argue that a significant grammaticalization of evidentiality is attested in English. Section 5 discusses the main findings and examines to what extent evidentiality is relevant in English. Finally, section 6 concludes the study, and offers suggestions for further research.
2 DISCUSSIONS ON EVIDENTIALITY AND GRAMMATICALIZATION

2.1 How to define evidentiality?

As is the case for many notions in linguistics, scholars have not reached full consensus on the definition of evidentiality. The dominant definition, and the one adopted in Aikhenvald (2004) and Aikhenvald (ed., 2018), is ‘the grammatical marking of information source’. Other scholars argue that evidentiality should not be limited to grammatical marking but also refers to lexical marking. For methodological purposes, I have chosen not to restrict evidentiality to its grammatical expression. The degree of grammaticality of English evidentials can only be assessed after listing the different tools available in English to encode evidential meaning without rejecting any marker because of its supposed lexical status.

For evidentiality to be relevant from a semantic point of view, the frontiers of its domain have to be clearly defined to distinguish it from neighbouring notions, such as epistemic modality, subjectivity, stance, or mirativity. The literature on linguistic typology reveals that evidentials can be divided into three main categories: direct perception, inference, and hearsay. These categories can be further subdivided, since direct perception may be visual, or involve other senses, an inference can be abductive, i.e. based on observations, or deductive, i.e. based on logic, and hearsay can refer to a general rumour, or a first-hand report, etc. The following graphic presents a taxonomy of evidential categories:2

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2 The graphic offers only one example of how evidentials can be categorized. Other taxonomies have been proposed by Willett (1988), Tournadre (2005), or Aikhenvald (2004: 63).
What all categories of evidential markers have in common is indeed that each of them refers to a specific type of information source, i.e. they specify in what way the information that is being shared has been accessed. I am thus adopting a morphologically open and semantically strict definition of evidentiality (see notably Schenner 2010): the linguistic expression of the source of the information shared by the speaker.

2.2 Evidentiality as a universal semantic notion

According to Aikhenvald (2004; 2007; ed., 2018), evidentiality should be used only for ‘evidential languages’ that possess grammatical morphemes dedicated to the expression of information source. She argues that using a broader definition challenges terminological clarity, and that languages which have not fully grammaticalized the notion simply resort to lexical ‘evidential strategies’ (Aikhenvald 2007). While it is true that evidentiality is far more grammaticalized in some languages than in others, seeing
evidentiality as a universal semantic notion presents clear heuristic advantages (Squartini 2007; Cornillie 2007; Cornillie et al. 2015). First, research on grammaticalization has shown that no criterion suffices in determining what is lexical and what is grammatical in a language, and that linguistic forms tend to be located at different places on a continuum between those two poles depending on the selected parameter (Newmeyer 2000; Campbell 2000; Brinton & Traugott 2005: 89–110). Secondly, considering some languages to be ‘evidential’ because they possess ‘evidential grammatical morphemes’ is disputable in many respects. First of all, it can be misleading to use a semantic term to refer to morphological or syntactic phenomena, since linguistic forms are generally used for a diversity of semantic functions. For example, traditional grammar calls would a ‘modal’, but this vaguely semantic name fails to capture its other functions, such as the expression of the iterative aspect. So-called ‘evidential morphemes’ of ‘evidential languages’ are also generally multifunctional, and are often exploited to express other notions, such as person, time, aspectuality, realis/irrealis modality, epistemic modality, passive voice, or mirativity (see Aikhenvald 2004: 105–52, 195–216). In addition, languages that are often considered ‘non-evidential’ do possess grammatical morphemes with evidential meanings. The French conditional inflection can, for example, express hearsay evidentiality (Dendale 1993), and an increasing number of papers also describe grammatical or semi-grammatical evidential forms in languages such as Spanish, or English (Cornillie 2007; Whitt 2010; Cornillie et al., 2015; Guentchéva, ed., 2018 inter alia). These reflections lead us to question whether it remains relevant to maintain a typological taxonomy with, on the one hand, ‘evidential languages’ and, on the other hand, ‘non-evidential languages’. Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 115) advocate a clear distinction between forms (tense, aspect, mood) and their semantic counterparts (time, aspectuality, modality). From this perspective, terminological clarity would encourage us to use the -ity variant for the semantic notion that can be rendered through the lexicon or the grammar of a language, and not for the forms themselves. Although English does not possess an inflectional mood system which is as developed as what can be found in a language like French, no linguist would argue that English does not express modality at all. Similarly, some languages may
possess a developed system of evidential inflections, but languages without such inflections may still encode evidentiality.

To sum up, I argue that evidentiality can be defined as a universal semantic domain that is encoded by a variety of linguistic forms, as is the case for time, aspectuality, or modality. In this paper, I will further argue that evidentiality is one of the few notions that tend to attract forms towards the grammatical end of the lexicon-grammar continuum, and that there is evidence of this force of attraction in English.

2.3 Why is evidentiality different from epistemic modality?

Scholars have dealt with the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality quite differently. Cornillie (2009), Whitt (2010), and Boye (2010b) give an overview of the diverse treatments of the two notions. It is, however, difficult to determine whether the debate is really ontological, or rather terminological, since authors use diverse definitions for the two notions. The dominant view nowadays is that evidentiality and epistemic modality have to be treated separately, even though some forms may express both. It is indeed possible to express evidentiality, i.e. the information source underlying a proposition, without expressing epistemic modality, i.e. the degree of likelihood of a proposition.

Unlike evidentiality, epistemic modality has been integrated in the grammatical description of English for decades (Perkins 1983; Traugott 1989; Bybee & Fleischman, eds., 1995; Nuyts 2001; Palmer 2001; 2014; Boye 2012). In the conceptual index of the Cambridge Grammar of the English Language (Huddleston & Pullum 2002), the epistemic modality entry refers to 17 sections, in striking contrast to evidentiality, which does not appear. In more recent reference grammars, such as the Oxford Modern English Grammar (Aarts 2011), as well as in the Oxford Handbook of English Grammar (Aarts et al., eds., 2020), evidentiality is not mentioned either. However, as the present paper argues, a close examination of the data reveals that evidentiality is as pervasive and grammaticalized in English as epistemic modality. The reason why the former is barely evoked in grammar books is merely historical, and will be argued to stem from a conceptual confusion between the two semantic domains. Due to the frequent conflation between the two notions, many grammatical or semi-grammatical forms of English have
been labelled ‘epistemic’, while they are sometimes both epistemic and evidential, or even sometimes only evidential. It is for example widely accepted to talk about the epistemic use of the auxiliary must in a sentence such as:

(1) She **must** have been wearing a black dress yesterday.

I would argue, however, that this use of *must* is not just epistemic, but also evidential. One can thus compare:

(2) I am not sure I remember correctly, but **I think** she was wearing a black dress yesterday.

(3) She always wears a black dress at parties, so she **must** have been wearing a black dress yesterday.

In example (2), the speaker’s uncertainty is due to the vagueness of his/her memory of a situation that he/she directly witnessed, which is a suitable context to use *I think*. Conversely, in example (3), the speaker’s uncertainty is caused by the fact that he/she did not witness the situation, but is just inferring what happened. This context will favour the use of *must*. These examples show that the choice between *I think* and *must* depends on the speaker’s information source. Even though this use of *must* is traditionally called ‘epistemic’, it could equally be called ‘evidential’, since *must* is avoided when the speaker’s statement is not based on an inference.

Other forms denote either epistemic modality or evidentiality, but not both. An adverb like *maybe* or a matrix clause like ‘I doubt that…’ expresses epistemic modality, but do not indicate the speaker’s information source. Conversely, constructions such as ‘Vegetables **taste** bland nowadays’, or ‘**I saw that** he had eaten the cake’ are evidential, but not epistemic. They specify how the speaker knows what he or she is saying, but do not question the validity of the proposition they modify.

Now that I have discussed what defines evidentiality, and before investigating whether evidentiality has indeed grammaticalized in English, I still need to specify what signs indicate grammaticalization.
2.4 How to define and assess grammaticalization?

Kuryłowicz (1975[1965]) defines grammaticalization as the transition of an autonomous word to a grammatical form, or the movement from a less grammatical status to a more grammatical status. As linguistic forms grammaticalize, they progress on a continuum by losing lexical properties and acquiring grammatical features. With very few exceptions, this process happens by a gradual series of individual shifts (Plank 1989; Lichtenberk 1991; see also Traugott & Trousdale, eds., 2010), and in a unidirectional fashion (Lehmann 1995 [1982]: 16; Haspelmath 2004; Börjars & Vincent 2011).

If one sees lexicon and grammar as two poles, there should be signs that enable us to measure where a linguistic form is located on this continuum. For that purpose, the publication of Lehmann’s parameters (Lehmann 1995 [1982]: 121–78) was a milestone in the establishment of the main criteria for diagnosing the degree of grammaticality of a form. The parameters proposed by Lehmann are integrity, paradigmaticity, paradigmatic variability, structural scope, bondedness, and syntagmatic variability.

These criteria correspond to diachronic processes that linguistic forms usually undergo when they are grammaticalizing. In order to illustrate these processes, let us consider one of the most cited cases of grammaticalization, namely the development of the French future chanterai ‘sing:FUT 1SG’ from the late Latin cantare habeo ‘sing:INF + have:PRES 1SG’:

i. Three processes correspond to a reduction of a form’s integrity:
   a. **Phonological attrition**, i.e. the partial loss or simplification of the pronunciation: habeo > -ai;
   b. **Desemanticization**, i.e. the loss of concrete semantic features: possession > deontic modality > future;
   c. **Decategorialization**, i.e. the loss of lexical morpho-syntactic properties: a verb with mood/tense/person inflections > a future inflection with person agreement;

ii. **Paradigmaticization** corresponds to an increase of a form’s paradigmaticity, i.e. its inclusion into a closed set: a verb replaceable by thousands of other verbs > an inflection in the closed paradigm of the French conjugation system;
iii. **Obligatorification** corresponds to a decline of a form’s paradigmatic variability, i.e. if the form is deleted, the sentence becomes ungrammatical: an optional verb > an obligatory inflection (*je chanter* ‘I sing’);

iv. **Condensation** corresponds to a contraction of a form’s structural scope: a verb whose syntactic scope can be a large phrase > an inflection whose syntactic scope is limited to its host verb;

v. **Coalescence** corresponds to a tightening of a form’s bondedness to its host: *cantare + habeo > chante-r-ai*;

vi. **Fixation** corresponds to a restraint on the syntagmatic variability of a form: a moveable verb > an inflection that must follow its host.

Most works on grammaticalization refer to quite similar criteria, even though certain authors may leave some out, and others may add one or two (Wiemer & Bisang 2004; Brinton & Traugott 2005: 89–110; Norde 2012; Kuteva et al., eds., 2019: 1–22). Norde (2012) points out that Lehmann’s taxonomy is not perfect, because some parameters have proven to be of little use to distinguish grammaticalization from other types of language change. I would argue that some of these parameters are indeed more relevant than others, and I have chosen to focus on only five processes that are particularly applicable for the present study: morphophonological reduction, desemanticization, backgrounding, decategorialization, and paradigmatization. In section 4, I will define more precisely each of the five processes selected, and give concrete examples.

There are several reasons why I consider processes such as obligatorification, condensation, coalescence, and fixation to be outside of the scope of this study. Obligatorification is problematic to measure because there are many types of syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic obligatoriness (Mélac 2018). Nothing is obligatory all the time in a language, and context plays a crucial role. Obligatorification is not necessary when a form grammaticalizes, and is attested in other kinds of linguistic changes (Heine & Kuteva 2007: 34). Moreover, although Aikhenvald (2007) stated that obligatoriness was a necessary factor to identify a grammatical evidential, she then retracted that claim, because many evidential inflections and clitics are perfectly deletable (Aikhenvald, ed., 2018: 10). In

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3 For an investigation of the grammaticalization of evidentiality in English according to these criteria, see Mélac (2014: 437–9, 448–52, 469–79, 483–95).
Tibetan, for example, evidential inflections and copulas are obligatory in the sense that deleting them when they appear in a matrix clause would usually make the sentence ungrammatical. However, from a semantic point of view, they can be substituted by other inflections and copulas that do not contain any inherent evidential feature. Tibetan evidential enclitics are syntactically optional, but they are often quasi-obligatory from a pragmatic point of view, and are usually considered fully grammatical.4

Condensation is also a controversial process, since syntactic scope expansion is very often attested for grammaticalizing forms (see Norde 2009: 126). For example, the conjunction *supposing* saw its scope expand to the clause level as it grammaticalized from a lexical verb (Visconti 2004). As far as evidentials are concerned, the potential scope of the Tibetan enclitic *-Ze* is larger than the scope of the lexical verb *zer* (‘say’), from which it nevertheless grammaticalized, just like the English adverb *apparently* saw its scope expand when it became a sentence adverb with an evidential meaning.

Coalescence may be a noticeable process for several forms becoming more grammatical, but it is not a very reliable symptom of grammaticalization. Prepositions, such as *off*, auxiliaries, such as *may*, or determiners, such as *this*, have not undergone any coalescence even though they are fully grammatical. In addition, coalescence is very often involved in other types of language change, such as lexicalization. Brinton & Traugott (2005: 63–7) cite numerous examples of lexical forms that result from a process of coalescence. In English, one can think of the words *ma’am*, which comes from the Old French *ma dame* (‘my lady’), or *England* from Old English *Ensla land* (OED).

Finally, fixation is also a problematic criterion to identify an instance of grammaticalization. As argued in Brinton & Traugott (2005: 138–40), the development of discourse markers can be seen as a case of grammaticalization, since it results from several processes that typically co-occur when a form grammaticalizes, such as desemanticization and decategorialization. However, discourse markers tend to acquire more syntagmatic freedom than their original forms. The English evidential expressions *I guess, I hear* or *it seems* are a case in point.

I have thus chosen to exclude obligatorification, condensation, coalescence, and fixation from my present investigation of English evidentials. However, I have included the

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4 For further information on evidentiality and obligatoriness, see Mélac (2014: 377–83, 474–9).
process of backgrounding, because this concept has become rather central to the definition of grammaticalization more recently. According to Boye & Harder (2012), grammatical expressions are ‘ancillary, and as such discursively secondary’, while lexical expressions can be ‘discursively primary’, i.e. the potential focus of an utterance. From this perspective, grammaticalization is synonymous to the ‘ancillarization’ of a form so that it may serve as a background support to a lexical unit. Traugott & Trousdale (2013: 10–5) acknowledge that this new perspective ‘suggests ways of addressing several problems’ that are left unanswered in the diverse theories of grammaticalization, and Kuteva et al. (2019: 5) argue that it is ‘perhaps the most attractive’ proposal to distinguish lexical and grammatical expressions. I found that the process of backgrounding was manifest in many cases of the grammaticalization of evidentiality in several languages, and thus I will take this criterion into account for the present study.

Now that I have clarified my approach to evidentiality and grammaticalization, I will specify the methodology I adopted to collect the data and observe how evidentiality is rendered in English.

3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The list of evidential forms I will refer to in this study is the result of the research I conducted in Mélac (2014). In this section, I will describe how I collected a corpus aimed at eliciting evidentials (3.1), and what criteria I used to identify what should be counted as an evidential (3.2).

3.1 Corpus collection and exploitation

In order to arrive at a list of evidentials that is as accurate as possible, the first step of my study was to collect a contrastive corpus of Tibetan and English using the same methodology of data elicitation for both languages. Tibetan possesses one of the most highly grammaticalized evidential systems, which covers the categories of direct perception, inference, and hearsay. Tibetan also presents a written record dating from the 8th century, providing evidence of how evidentiality grammaticalized, which helped me
identify patterns potentially applicable to English. I collected the English part of the corpus at Cambridge University (‘Cambridge Student Corpus’, 18 native English speakers, ~26,100 words), and the Tibetan part at Tibet University in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, P.R.C. (‘Tibet Student Corpus’, 8 native speakers of standard Tibetan, ~25,706 words).

The methodology of corpus collection was designed to elicit as many evidentials as possible in a context of conversation between two native speakers. The subjects were requested to ask each other questions related to various information sources, such as ‘Could you tell me how your parents met?’, ‘Tell me about a dream you had’, or ‘Tell me about a story that happened to you when you were three years old’. I also used three activities: recognizing what a set of pictures represent, identifying sounds, and reporting the content of a comic strip. This contrastive corpus allowed me to pinpoint what types of evidential forms spontaneously emerge in conversation in Tibetan, and to see how often, as well as in what way, English speakers express their information sources in the same situations. The English part of the corpus contains approximately 2,000 evidential forms, but the expression of information source is, as expected, both rarer and more varied in English than in Tibetan.5 After completing my investigation with the help of larger corpora, such as the COCA, I presented a preliminary description of Present-day English evidential forms that intended to be as exhaustive as possible (Mélac 2014: 149–365).6 English speakers mark evidentiality by using words and phrases that belong to many syntactic categories. Following are just a few examples:

- **Perception verbs**: I hear, I can see…
- **Perception copulas**: looks like, sound…
- **Cognition verbs**: I guess, I imagine…
- **Verbs of speaking**: be said to, they say…
- **Modal auxiliaries**: must, should…
- **Adverbs**: apparently, allegedly…
- **Complex prepositions**: according to…

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5 The data from the contrastive corpus showed that, overall, evidentiality seems to be expressed approximately 6 times more frequently in Tibetan than in English (Mélac 2014: 384–7).

6 For more information on the methodology I used for collecting a corpus, and testing the properties of English evidential forms, see Mélac (2014: 76–85).
I will now present what method I used in order to verify whether a form should be included in the list of evidentials.

3.2 Identification of evidentials

Adopting the strict definition of evidentiality mentioned in 2.1, I only considered a linguistic form to be evidential when it explicitly denoted which of the three main information sources the speaker relied on when making his/her statement:

i. Did the speaker witness the situation? (direct perception evidentiality)

ii. Did he/she infer it? (inferential evidentiality)

iii. Did he/she hear about it? (hearsay evidentiality)

The form had to have scope over some propositional content, adding a metapropositional qualification of evidentiality. A separate sentence such as ‘I saw it’ does reveal the speaker’s information source, but cannot be considered an evidential because the information it pertains to is not included in the same sentence.

Tests involving (a) the deletion of markers, and (b) the use of these markers in a variety of contexts were applied to verify the evidential nature of the different forms. For example, *I hear* in ‘I hear John kissed Mary’ is an evidential because it specifies that the speaker knows about John’s action through hearsay. Deleting *I hear* would result in making a statement without mentioning how one knows about the shared piece of information. Adding ‘I saw it’ or ‘I inferred it’ after ‘I hear John kissed Mary’ sounds incoherent, which confirms that *I hear + finite clause* is incompatible with a context of direct perception or inference. Conversely, I did not consider an adverb such as *clearly* to be evidential because it is compatible with all information sources: ‘John clearly kissed Mary... I saw it / I inferred it / I heard about it’.

However, the identification and classification of evidentials can be a challenging task for a number of forms. For example, the adjective *obvious* might appear to express evidentiality in a sentence such as:

(4) **It is obvious that** Jasper is in love with Alice and would do anything for her.

(COCA: Web: *Jasper Hale – Twilight Saga Wiki*, 2012)
The matrix clause of this example seems to indicate that the speaker shares his or her opinion based on what he or she has observed. However, I would not classify such a construction as a prototypical evidential because *obvious* is ambiguously polysemic, and often expresses certainty without clearly specifying whether the speaker has witnessed the situation directly, inferred it, or heard about it. The evidential meaning of *obvious* in (4) emerges more from an implicature than an intrinsic semantic feature.

Now that I have specified what I consider to be an English evidential, I am going to examine to what extent they have grammaticalized.

4 Signs of grammaticalization of evidentiality in English

Many English evidentials have undergone changes that are typical of lexical forms progressing towards (semi-)grammaticality. As mentioned in 2.4, the five criteria I will explore are: reduction, desemanticization, backgrounding, decategorialization, and paradigmatization. While space constraints prevent me from exploring the complete set of evidential strategies for each of the five parameters, I will consider, and test each parameter with a number of English evidentials taken from a variety of sources. Adopting a wide perspective will allow me to examine how relevant the notion of evidentiality is in English in general, and I thus hope to contribute to the debate on the relation between evidentiality and grammaticalization.

4.1 Morpho-phonological reduction

Numerous studies have shown a correlation between grammaticalization and reduction (Heine & Reh 1984: 21; Bybee & Pagliuca 1985; Lehmann 1995 [1982]: 113 *inter alia*), and it is possible to observe signs that many English evidentials have undergone
reduction. For example, the inferential marker *I suppose* tends to be pronounced in a reduced form, as is attested by its transcription in several written texts:

(5) See the little swelling buds! See how plain they’re showing! *S’pose* they know they’re going to make peaches, apples, cherries. (COHA: M. M. Dodge, *When life is young*, 1894)

From a phrase made up of three syllables, *I suppose* often erodes to one syllable in contemporary English. While the deletion of a subject pronoun is a common phenomenon, and does not only concern evidentials, phrases dedicated to the expression of evidentiality seem to be more easily reduced than mere lexical combinations, since *s’pose* clearly stands for *I suppose*, and not for *they suppose*.

The process of reduction can indeed be observed in many other English evidentials, as shown by how they are sometimes transcribed in contemporary novels:


(7) **Heard** she’s adopting more children. (COCA: C. Crane, *The bad always die twice*, 2011)

(8) **Mus’**ve been a detective from a thriller series. (A. Wendt, *Black rainbow*, 1992)

Some would further argue that reduction is nonetheless a widespread process which concerns frequent linguistic forms located at various places on the lexicon-grammar continuum. Reduction is a multifactorial phenomenon and frequency is indeed one of the major factors predicting it (Bybee 2003: 38–43). Nevertheless, previous research has shown that grammaticalized forms are often more reduced than equally frequent, lexical forms. For example, when *do* is an auxiliary, it is usually reduced to /d(ə)/ whereas lexical *do* is pronounced /duː/. Several examples of evidential markers that have undergone morpho-phonological reduction corroborate this tendency. The left-periphery markers *ØLooks like* and *ØSounds like* are, for example, reduced forms specialized in the expression of evidentiality. They denote that the speaker infers a situation based on some sensory evidence particularly when the subject *it* is deleted.
(9) **Looks like** you nailed it. (COCA: Web *Abusing celebrities with cancer in order to promote quackery*, 2012)

Conversely, *It looks like* or *It sounds like* may express the mere appearance of a situation, not specifying what the situation actually is. In these cases, it is possible to negate the content of the subordinate clause.

(10) **It looks like** you nailed it, but actually you didn’t.

However, when the pronoun *it* is dropped, the meaning of the same phrase becomes unambiguously inferential, making it less appropriate to contradict the content it introduces:

(11) ??**Looks like** you nailed it, but actually you didn’t.

The specialization of reduced phrases such as Ø*Looks like* and Ø*Sounds like* in the encoding of inferential evidentiality, whereas their non-reduced versions can have a more literal meaning, therefore suggests that they have partially grammaticalized.

### 4.2 Desemanticization

While it is true that all linguistic forms can undergo semantic change, some forms see their meaning evolve towards a semantic domain that is typically grammatical. They lose concrete meaning in a process usually called ‘desemanticization’, or ‘semantic bleaching’ (Traugott 1989; Heine 1993: 89; Ziegeler 1997). All semantic domains can be expressed with lexical forms whereas only a few domains (such as time, number, gender, causality, etc.) can be encoded with grammatical means (Slobin 1997; Talmy 2000). Indeed, in none of the world’s languages have we found grammatical words or inflections meaning ‘bone’, ‘bird’, ‘being in love’, or ‘blue’. The grammaticalization of a form thus typically implies a semantic shift from a specific, concrete meaning to a more generic, schematic meaning. This pattern of semantic change can be observed in the evolution of many
English evidentials. Let us consider for example the emergence of sentence-initial *ØLooks like* in English.

According to the OED, the verb *look* comes from Old English *locian* (with several allomorphs). Like its Germanic cognates, *locian* initially meant ‘to direct one’s sight’, and its first recorded meaning thus referred to a concrete action. A subsequent meaning of the verb *look*, when it is associated with adverbs, is ‘to direct one's gaze in a manner expressive of a certain thought or feeling; […] to present a specified facial expression’ (OED, s.v. look, v., def. I1b):

(12) Godd..lokel wræðlice uppe hem ðe euele doð.

‘God looks with anger upon those who do evil.’ (OED: *Vices and Virtues*, F. Holthausen, ed., 1888, a1225)

This specific meaning seems to have led to the broader sense of ‘having a certain visual appearance’ (def. II.11b), as the verb started being employed as a copula from the 14th c., first with animate subjects, and later with inanimate subjects:

(13) The Clowde began to vanish away, and the heauens looked fayre and cheerefull as before.

‘The cloud began to vanish away, and the sky looked beautiful and cheerful as before.’ (OED: *The famous, pleasant, and delightful history of Palladine of England*, A. Munday, translated by C. Colet, 1588)

The construction *look as if* preceded by a personal subject starts appearing at around the same period (def. P2 b), but one has to wait until the mid-17th c. before seeing the construction *look as if* with an impersonal subject:

(14) It looks as if men had no designe in the world, but to be suffered to die quietly.

(OED: *Vnum necessarium*, Jeremy Taylor, 1655)

Although *as if* has often been replaced by *like* since the later Middle English period in several contexts, the first instances of the impersonal construction *It looks like + clause* only emerged in the 19th c.
(15) **It looks like** it belonged to another Continent and to another age of the world.

(COHA: W. T. Thompson, *Major Jones's sketches of travel*, 1848)

This phrase first meant that the situation has the appearance of something it is not, and later that the speaker presumes what the situation is like. Finally, the construction eroded into the left-periphery marker Ø*Looks like*, and saw its frequency rise from the end of the 19th century, it retained the strict evidential meaning ‘from what I can see, I can infer that…’:

(16) **Looks like** all the Deef Woman wants is to be let alone, while she makes a play the best she can for a home-stake. (COHA: A. H. Lewis, *Wolfville*, 1897)

The different stages that led the lexical verb *look* to the evidential Ø*Looks like* are summed up in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semantic evolution from the action verb look to the evidential ØLooks like</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>direct one’s sight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revealing one’s inner states through facial expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>having a certain visual appearance (for a person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>having a certain visual appearance (for an object)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>having a certain visual appearance (for a situation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the speaker infers a situation from visual cues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This kind of semantic change is typical of grammaticalization, since *look* has evolved from a concrete action verb to encoding some meta-propositional qualification. The same pattern is observable in the evidential Ø*Sounds like* + *clause*, which ended up encoding an inference based on auditory or verbal evidence after a long process of grammaticalization, which started from the semantic extension of the Old French action verb *suner* (‘to emit a sound’).

Several other English evidentials have developed from lexical verbs, such as the parentheticals formed on the *I guess* pattern. The original verbs refer to precise cognitive
processes whereas their uses as parentheticals are now specialized in the encoding of inferential evidentiality. For example, one can compare *imagine* used lexically to the inferential *I imagine*.

(17) He **imagined** that he looked like the Buddha himself, under a flowering lotus tree, serene in meditation. (COCA: R. Rougeau, ‘Cello’; *The Atlantic monthly*, 2000)

(18) My supervisor, Ceci, appears in the doorway. **I imagine** we've been making a racket. "Is everything all right in here?" she asks. (COCA: K. D’Agostino, *The Sleepy Hollow family almanac*, 2012)

Lexical *imagine* (in 17) refers to the act of generating a mental picture representing a fictive scene whereas *I imagine* (in 18) encodes that the speaker’s statement results from an inference.

Another process of semantic change which typically occurs when a form grammaticalizes is subjectification. Grammatical forms tend to encode meaning from the perspective of the speaker while their lexical sources can be matched with several points of view (see Traugott 1989). Subjectification concerns many English evidentials, further suggesting their movements towards the grammatical pole of the lexicon-grammar continuum. One can for instance compare Ø*Looks like + clause* to its non-reduced form *It looks like + clause*.

(19) She told me that when you drink something hot, never sip it the first time. Instead, dip your top lip into the cup. That way **it looks like** you're drinking, but instead you're testing. (COHA: E. Krouse, *Other people's mothers*, 1999)

(20) I’ve been watching the standings. **Looks like** you’re heading to the World Championship this year. (COCA: J. Graves, *Cowboy take me away*, 2013)

*It looks like* can refer to other people’s impressions of a situation, whereas Ø*Looks like* typically expresses an inference made by the speaker.

Several other cases of subjectification are noticeable when examining the semantic evolution of markers that are used nowadays to denote evidentiality. For example, inferential *must* can be seen as a subjectified extension of deontic *must*:
(21) It was a law among them that when the lord of the group spoke, the others must obey. (COHA: V. Fisher, *Darkness and the Deep*, 1943)

(22) His handwriting was steady, precise, so he must have worn his reading glasses. (COCA: P. Painter, ‘Hindsight’; *Kenyon Review*, 2013)

In the example (21), *must* has a deontic meaning, and the obligation it expresses is not imposed by the speaker, but by a law established in a group. Inferential *must* is considered a further grammaticalization of deontic *must*, and as illustrated in (22), this specific meaning is construed by adopting the speaker’s perspective, since this example could easily be paraphrased by ‘I presume he wore…’, and far less convincingly by ‘John presumes he wore…’.

Grammaticalization is all the more evident when semantic bleaching is tightly associated with a subjective perspective. The distinct evolution of evidential markers consisting of the 1st person singular pronoun and a cognition verb is a case in point. *Guess* or *imagine* as lexical verbs are, by definition, compatible with all types of subjects. However, when used with the 1st person, these verbs not only see their syntactic behaviour change, but their semantics also bleaches, since they no longer express a specific mental process but present the proposition they are related to as an inference. In other words, it is specifically when those verbs are used subjectively that their meaning bleaches and comes to encode inferential evidentiality.

### 4.3 Backgrounding

Boye & Harder (2009) argue that grammatical forms are prototypically more backgrounded than lexical forms. It seems indeed true that evidential markers are more informatively prominent in English than in languages with an inflectional evidential system, partly because verbs or adverbs are more salient forms than inflections, which normally cannot be the focus of an utterance (Mélac 2014: 394–400). However, a closer examination of the data reveals that many English evidentials are more backgrounded than fully lexical expressions, and do show signs of evolution towards backgroundedness. The ‘non-focalizability’ of grammatical expressions can be revealed by several tests
(Boye & Harder 2012), such as the impossibility of receiving a nuclear stress, of being modified by a focus marker, or of being the focus of a cleft sentence. These tests suggest that evidential adverbs, such as presumably, are more grammatical than other adverbs, such as recently. In a prototypical sentence, the nuclear stress is unlikely to fall on presumably while recently can receive it. In examples (23) and (24), the underlined syllable represents the nuclear stress:

(23) ?? He’s been seeing her presumably.
(24) He’s been seeing her recently.

A grammatical form cannot be in the semantic scope of focus markers, such as just:

(25) * He’s been seeing her just presumably.
(26) He’s been seeing her just recently.

Finally, a grammatical form cannot be foregrounded in a cleft construction:

(27) *It is only presumably that he’s been seeing her.
(28) It is only recently that he’s been seeing her.

When an evidential is a matrix clause, one would think logically that its meaning has a higher informational status than the content of its subordinate clause. However, Thompson & Mulac (1991) have shown how clauses such as I think or I guess have lost their matrix clause status, and have been pushed into the background. This mechanism of ‘desubordination’ is observed very frequently when examining the grammaticalization of evidentiality from a typological perspective (Friedman 2018). The secondary status of these matrix clauses can be revealed by a question-tag test. If a speaker chooses to use a question tag after a sentence whose matrix clause has an evidential and/or epistemic meaning, the tag will quite often be formed by extracting the auxiliary and the subject from the subordinate clause, whereas they should be extracted from the matrix clause in a canonical sentence.

(29) I guess he’d be with you then, wouldn’t he? (COCA: Spoken Ind_Springer, 1997)
This genuine example sounds perfectly well-formed, but if the matrix clause ‘I guess…’ is replaced by another matrix clause, such as ‘They decided…’, it would not be acceptable to form the question tag with the subject and auxiliary of the subordinate clause:

(30) *They decided he’d be with you then, wouldn’t he?

(31) They decided he’d be with you then, didn’t they?

Another test suggesting the backgroundedness of a form is its lack of addressability (Boye & Harder 2012). Grammatical expressions typically cannot be questioned by WH-words. One can compare:

(32) *I guess he’d be with you then.’
   ‘How?’

(33) They decided he’d be with you then.’
   ‘How?’

The question ‘How?’ in (32) is bound to be interpreted as ‘How would he be with me?’ , and not as ‘*How do you guess?’ . Conversely, the same question in (33) can be interpreted as ‘How did they decide?’.

Evidentials are typically in the background because they no longer participate in the state of affairs described by the speaker, but simply specify how the speaker got to know what he is stating. Accordingly, as an evidential expression grammaticalizes, the information it has scope over becomes the main point of the sentence. This does not mean that the speaker always commits to the truth of the proposition, but that the information is at least reliable enough to be shared, and that stating the opposite would sound contradictory. To see more clearly what this entails, one can compare a lexical use of a form with its evidential use. In the first example, it is possible to add ‘even though I know it isn’t true’, whereas, in the second example, it would sound contradictory:

(34) I often imagine that I can see her beckoning me to the happy world to which she has gone. (COHA: A. Nehemiah, Catharine, 1859)
   (even though I know it isn’t true)
(35) You have spoken to the landlord, too, I **imagine**. (COCA: E. Phyllis, *The Caravan to Nowhere*, 2014)

(*even though I know it isn’t true)

These tests reveal that many forms expressing evidentiality in English are more backgrounded than their lexical equivalents. It suggests that evidentiality is a notion which, even in English, tends to push into the background linguistic units encoding it, strengthening the hypothesis that these forms have partially grammaticalized.

4.4 Decategorialization

The process of grammaticalization involves the reanalysis of linguistic units according to certain clines (Hopper & Traugott 2003: 6–7). These units typically shift from an open-class to a closed-class category, and all the world’s languages apparently have this dual system of lexical and grammatical forms. Lexical forms belong to categories that contain hundreds, or thousands of members, and allow new members easily (nouns, verbs…), while grammatical forms belong to categories that possess very few members and rarely accept new ones (determiners, auxiliaries, inflections, etc.). A form starts losing its membership in a major part of speech when it loses the syntactic properties associated with it. For example, when a noun grammaticalizes into a preposition, it loses what syntactically defines it as a noun, such as the singular/plural inflection, the possibility to be determined by an article or modified by an adjective, etc. Many English items expressing evidentiality have been reanalysed into closed classes (modals, copulas, subject-raising verbs) or semi-closed classes (parentheticals, sentence adverbs, discourse markers, complex prepositions). A sample set of examples will be discussed in what follows.

The inferential markers *must* and *should* belong to the category of auxiliaries. In Old English, *must* and *should* behaved essentially like other lexical verbs, but as they grammaticalized, they lost inflectional properties, such as person indexing, and their usage became restricted to grammatical modifications to a main lexical verb (Roberts 1985). Other verbs employed to express evidentiality may not have reached the full status of auxiliaries, but they have clearly taken a step in that direction. The verbs *seem* and
appear are evidential subject-raising verbs when they license an infinitive, since their syntactic subject is semantically linked to the verb in the infinitive, and these two verbs typically express that the speaker infers the proposition from his or her observations. Both seem + infinitive and appear + infinitive have lost lexical properties, as their syntactic behaviour resembles that of auxiliaries in a number of aspects. They cannot refer to a new state-of-affairs, but can only qualify the proposition expressed by the main verb. They are also largely incompatible with certain inflectional constructions, such as the passive voice. Furthermore, they can be associated with syntactic constructions that are typical of the inferential use of modals, such as the perfect infinitive, or post-modified negation:

(36) You seem to have forgotten that I too have some skill in my poor way. (COHA: W. G. Simms, Charlemont: Or, the Pride of the Village. A Tale of Kentucky, 1856)

(37) The T'kai have no words for time. They also appear not to die. We're sending you to investigate. (COHA: A. Steele, Tom Swift and His Humongous Mechanical Dude, 2001)

The construction ‘seem to have V-en’ in (36) is comparable to the auxiliary construction ‘must have V-en’. The construction ‘appear not’ in (37) adopts the post-modified negation typical of auxiliaries, and competes with the quasi-synonymous construction ‘doesn’t appear’. Lastly, seem and appear have partially lost their ability to be modified by adverbs, contrary to other, more lexical verbs, such as ‘mean’:

(38) I never mean to hurt anybody. (COCA: Spoken ABC, 1994)

(39) I never seem to hurt anybody.

In both cases, the adverb never is placed before the first verb in the sentence, but in example (38) never has scope over mean, while in (39), it has scope over hurt. Example (38) can be interpreted as ‘I may hurt people, but never intentionally’ whereas (39) would be more easily glossed by ‘I never hurt anybody, it seems’, which suggests that seem is not actually modified by never.7

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7 For further information on the special properties of the verb seem, see Aijmer (2009), de Haan (2007), and Whitt (2015).
Several other forms have partially lost their lexical privileges when they mark evidentiality, such as the verb ‘accord’, which cannot receive any inflection other than -ing when it encodes hearsay evidentiality in the complex preposition according to:

(40) **According to** Mom, this was no coincidence. (COCA: A. Gretes, Sweat a wormhole, 2019)

Finally, the loss of inflection typical of decategorialization may also explain why several grammaticalized evidential phrases such as *I hear* or *I guess* are used with the zero inflection in cases where they refer to an acquisition of information that must have happened in the past.8

### 4.5 Paradigmatization

Paradigmatization is listed in Lehmann (1995 [1982]) as one of the most prominent criteria of grammaticalization. A grammatical paradigm can be identified by a closed set of markers that appear in the same syntagmatic domain, and encode several subcategories of a highly homogeneous semantic frame. English ‘modals’ are a perfect example of a paradigm, as they constitute a closed set of forms, and each one of them encodes a subcategory of a similar semantic frame. They appear in a specific syntagmatic domain since they possess their own slot inside the English verb phrase structure, as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 The structure of the English verb phrase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Modal)</strong> (Have + V-en) (Be + V-en) (Be + V-ing) V(inflection)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frame of a paradigm is not airtight because the functions of linguistic forms keep evolving (Nørgård-Sørensen & Heltof 2015). As such, so-called ‘modals’ are not

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8 The use of the present simple to refer to a moment of information acquisition that must have occurred in the past is related to what Denison (1992) calls “information present”. It is attested in several evidential markers, such as *I guess*, *I suppose*, *I see*, or *I hear*. These specific phrases have been selected for the expression of evidentiality, since synonymous expressions, such as *I infer*, or *I learn*, cannot be used with the present simple to encode evidentiality, as they would not typically refer to a past moment of acquisition.
only used to express modality, but also other notions such as time, aspect, and evidentiality.

Paradigmatization is often seen as resulting from decategorialization. The latter involves the eviction of a linguistic form from an open-class category, and the former refers to the complete adherence of this form to a closed set. However, certain forms may be more advanced on one parameter than the other, which justifies treating the two processes separately. The paradigm of perception copulas is a good example of forms that do not display many signs of syntactic erosion but constitute a homogeneous paradigm. Despite their varied origins, the copulas look, sound, feel, taste and smell have each taken a different path that led them to the same evidential paradigm. The etymology of look, feel, and smell is Anglo-Saxon, whereas the verbs sound and taste come from Old French (OED). Their diverse routes to the same destination typically illustrate the process of paradigmatization, which involves ‘a levelling out of the differences with which the members were equipped originally’ (Lehmann 1995 [1982]: 135). These copulas now belong to a closed set sharing a specific syntagmatic domain, since a very limited number of verbs in English can be complemented by an adjectival phrase as a subject complement, a prepositional phrase in like, or a clause introduced by as if or like. Their semantic frame is clearly evidential, as they encode either a direct perception or an inference, further specifying which sensory channel led to this impression. The syntactic and semantic organization of the perception copula paradigm is summed up in the following table:

9 For further information on English perception copulas, see notably Whitt (2010) and Gisborne & Holmes (2007).
Table 3 The perception copula paradigm and its evidential functions (simplified)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>+ look (visual or general observation)</th>
<th>+ sound (auditory or verbal)</th>
<th>+ adj. (direct or inferential)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ feel (tactile or proprioceptive)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+ like + noun (inferential)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ taste (gustatory)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+ like + clause (inferential)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ smell (olfactive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are other examples of English evidentials that function in a paradigm, such as the cognition verb constructions I guess/I suppose/I imagine/I assume, etc. These phrases are based on the same model, and organized in a closed set. They share the syntactic properties of parentheticals, allowing them to be inserted in various positions in a sentence, and they all express epistemic modality and inferential evidentiality with subtle semantic and discursive nuances.

The special behaviour of all these markers shows that evidentiality is not a semantic domain like any other, since evidentiality tends to impact the internal and external syntax of the lexical forms encoding it. Evidentiality seems to make linguistic forms behave more and more like grammatical items, leading them to closed-class categories. It can nevertheless be argued that the grammaticalization of evidentiality is still partial in English, since these forms have not reached the final stage of the process, which would be to bind to a host word, and work as an inflection. However, is it really true that English does not possess any inflection which can encode evidentiality?

4.6 Evidential inflections in English?

It is generally accepted that the verbal inflections of English denote the grammatical categories of person (3rd person -s), tense (present -/s vs past -ed), and aspect (gnomic or habitual -/ vs progressive -ing vs perfect -en). It is also accepted that the ‘past inflection’ -ed can also encode ‘modal remoteness’ in some contexts, as in ‘If he worked…’ or ‘I wish he worked…’. However, for the -ed inflection to mark modal remoteness, the sentence has to include a specific trigger, such as the de-actualizing
conjunction *if* or the boulomaic verb *wish*. Might there exist special contexts where evidentiality determines the choice of an inflection in English?

Let us consider the following examples:

(41) **I heard** that he takes showers, you know - when he's having a bad game he'll take a shower at half time, you know. (COCA: Spoken *NPR_ATC*, 2007)

(42) **I heard** him take showers.

The propositions introduced by *I heard* will be interpreted differently depending on the form of the clause, which is determined by the inflection of its verb. The latter can be either finite (with the present or past inflection, as in example 41) or non-finite (with the gerund or bare infinitive inflection, as in example 42). What motivates the choice between the two options is the evidential specification given to the proposition. When the verb in the subordinate clause is finite, the speaker knows about the situation from hearsay, whereas a clause with a non-finite verb encodes an auditory perception.

Other examples reveal the exploitation of the English inflectional system to encode evidentiality. The past participle inflection is used in English for the passive voice construction (*be* + *V*-en), and transitive verbs can normally appear in the active or passive voice. However, as Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 1435) point out, three verbal constructions happen to be limited to the passive voice: *be said to*, *be rumoured to*, and *be reputed to*. What is particularly striking is that these three constructions are specialized in the expression of hearsay evidentiality. The verb *say* can undeniably be used in the active voice, but it will only be followed by an infinitive clause with a jussive function, and not a declarative function. One can therefore compare:

(43) Mom **says to** be there at two o’clock. (COCA: C. Johnson, *That mistletoe moment*, 2007)

(44) Queen Elizabeth **is said to** be devoted to her children. (COCA: K. Emerson, *Secrets of the Tudor Court: The pleasure palace*, 2009)

In example (43), *say* is in the active voice, and the infinitive clause can only be interpreted with a jussive meaning. In example (44), the use of *be* + *V*-en transforms the meaning of the whole construction, which then encodes hearsay (see also Noël 2001).
Finally, one can notice that most modal auxiliaries of modern English have retained a dual system of inflections: *can/could, may/might, shall/should,* and *will/would.* The system is now very asymmetric. The first inflection of the modal *shall* is, for example, limited to the expression of deontic modality, whereas its second inflection *should* can either have a deontic or an inferential meaning:

(45) This is a niche he **should** know well: Jacobs was Canada's downhill champion in 1957. (COCA: Magazine Skiing, 1993)

In this example, *should* expresses an inference, since ‘he *should* know’ could be paraphrased by ‘I *suppose* he knows’. Replacing *should* by *shall* would not change the time reference of the state-of-affairs or the strength of the modal qualification, but would simply be infelicitous. One can thus conclude that the so-called ‘past inflection’ of *shall* has developed some specific extensions, one of which being the encoding of inferential evidentiality for a present or future state of affairs. It is yet another case where an inflection is used to encode evidentiality.

Evidentiality can therefore be expressed by forms that belong to closed-class categories in English, and even by verbal inflections in specific contexts. Those inflections do not result from lexical items that have gradually grammaticalized into evidential markers. Instead, they are forms that had already grammaticalized for a particular function, and have been recycled into evidentials. Some would argue that these examples of semantic shifts are not actual cases of grammaticalization, because the forms in question were already grammatical. However, several studies have shown that the evidential inflections of so-called ‘evidential languages’ also result from the semantic shifts of forms that had previously grammaticalized for another function. For example, inferential evidential inflections come from perfect aspect inflections in many languages (Willett 1988; Mélac 2014: 433–4; Johanson 2018). In Tibetan, direct perception evidentials come from locative or directional inflections (Tournadre 1996; Oisel 2013: 75–9; Mélac 2014: 432–3). Other evidentials seem to result from the semantic evolution of past tense inflections, as in Matses, a Panoan language (Fleck 2007: 614).10 The grammaticalization of these forms occurred before they could even encode evidentiality,

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10 For further information on the origin of evidentials in the world’s languages, see Friedman (2018) and Kuteva et al. (eds., 2019: 60–1, 226–7, 247–8, 318–9, 381–2, 390).
but it does not change the fact that they have indeed grammaticalized and are now used to express evidentiality. The contexts of use of English evidentials may be more limited than in some other, non-Indo-European languages, but it can no longer be maintained that English grammar does not encode evidentiality.

5 Discussion

The previous analysis has offered a non-exhaustive synthesis of the signs revealing that evidentiality is partly grammatical in English. I have chosen several forms that can encode the semantic domain of evidentiality, and assessed whether they have undergone processes of change that are typical of grammaticalization. As in so-called ‘evidential languages’, English grammatical evidentials come either from lexical forms expressing information sources that have undergone grammaticalization, or from forms that were already grammatical, and which have extended their uses to the evidential domain. The data on English evidentials show that the grammaticalization of evidentiality is substantial, and seriously question the widespread belief that evidentiality has only grammaticalized in a few non-Indo-European languages. Evidentiality is instead a necessary concept for a thorough description of English grammar.

Some would argue that linguistic change is an omnipresent phenomenon, and that similar processes could be observed, regardless of the semantic domain investigated. While it is true that all linguistic forms can undergo changes, certain linguistic changes, such as decategorialization and paradigmatization, are only symptomatic of grammaticalization, and concern a very limited number of forms. Furthermore, it is the accumulation of changes typical of grammaticalization that allows me to state that evidentiality is a semantic notion with a special force of attraction towards the grammatical end of the lexicon-grammar continuum. In other frequent semantic domains such as anatomy, health, behaviour, food, colour, politics, sports, or arts, words do evolve, but it is not the case that the linguistic units expressing these domains behave more and more like grammatical forms.

Other scholars might argue that the linguistic forms that I have described belong to syntactic categories that are too disparate to talk about evidentiality as one consistent
grammatical category. In reality, the expression of evidentiality is not as consistent as one could imagine in so-called ‘evidential languages’, since inflectional paradigms are multifunctional, and all such languages do have lexical and semi-grammatical ways to render the notion in addition to the grammatical means (see Mélac 2014: 371–411). It is generally accepted that time and modality are grammatical notions in English, while they are frequently expressed by inflections, auxiliaries, semi-auxiliaries, and adverbs, among other means. What makes evidentiality a consistent notion is that it refers to a coherent semantic domain. Like any semantic domain that triggers grammaticalization, it influences various lexical forms moving towards grammatical categories at different paces.

The grammaticalization of certain forms may be more advanced on certain criteria and less on others. For example, *I guess* has undergone reduction because it is almost never followed by the complementizer *that* and its pronominal subject is frequently omitted. It has desemanticized, since it no longer refers to a specific mental process but to a broad inferential qualification. It is backgrounded, as revealed by the tag question test. It has also decategorialized in the sense that selecting the evidential meaning greatly limits the possibilities of inflections and modifications for the verb *guess*. One may say that it has also paradigmmatized, as it appears in a syntactic slot where the speaker can choose from several alternatives such as *I suppose* or *I assume*. However, it seems that the paradigm is not as closed and clear-cut as other paradigms such as the modal auxiliary paradigm, or the copular verb paradigm in English.

The auxiliary *must* has desemanticized when it encodes an inferential meaning. It has clearly decategorialized and paradigmmatized since it no longer has the properties of lexical verbs, and can only be used in a specific slot within the verb phrase structure. However, some scholars have pointed out that it is rarely reduced when used as an inferential marker, and the tests of backgroundedness are only partially conclusive.

Sentence-initial *Looks like* combines desemanticization and backgroundedness particularly in its reduced form. One can say that it has decategorialized because using this phrase with an evidential meaning limits its possibilities in terms of inflections and modifications. Finally, even though it does not seem to have clearly entered a closed class of parts of speech, it appears in the category of left-periphery particles where it can
alternate with *φ*Sounds like*, each expressing a different subcategory (visual inference vs auditory inference) of the same evidential frame.

Even though certain English evidentials meet more criteria of grammaticality than others, all evidence confirms that evidentiality does have grammaticalizing tendencies in English. Table 4 illustrates this point by presenting six common English evidentials, and evaluating them according to the five criteria of grammaticalization investigated in this study. A - sign is used when the given evidential does not show clear evidence of validation of the given criterion. A + sign appears when the given evidential meets the given criterion, suggesting that it may have grammaticalized. A ++ sign indicates that the given evidential shows significant advancement towards the grammatical pole of the lexicon-grammar continuum according to the given criterion.

Table 4 *Parameters of grammaticalization (6 common English evidentials)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidential</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
<th>Desemanticization</th>
<th>Backgrounding</th>
<th>Decategorialization</th>
<th>Paradigmatization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I guess</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look + adj.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>øLooks like</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<td>I hear</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

6 Conclusion

There may be differences between so-called ‘evidential languages’ such as Quechua or Tibetan, and other languages like English, but the data presented here argued against a dichotomous view of evidentiality, which would underestimate its relevance for the majority of languages. This investigation did not challenge the fact that languages differ
in the degree of grammaticalization of some of their evidentials, but aimed to disprove that English evidential system is purely lexical.

Further research is required to fully account for the phenomenon, but it is unlikely that the linguistic changes that led to the forms encoding evidentiality in English have happened by sheer accident. As we know, not all semantic domains trigger such patterns of evolution. The evolution of forms expressing evidentiality towards the grammatical pole of the lexicon-grammar continuum confirms that this notion is pertinent and necessary for a thorough linguistic description of English grammar. It also suggests that this semantic domain has to be investigated as a potential grammaticalizing notion in all language families. Evidentiality does not seem to be so much a grammatical category present in only a few ‘exotic languages’, but rather a universal functional niche that has an observable impact on the lexicon-grammar interface of any language.
REFERENCES


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